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CASE COMMENTS

Clearly the court in the instant case had little choice between approaches
to the treatment problem in Alabama mental institutions. Given the low

budget and inadequate facilities of the institutions in question, the sheer
number of patients with cause to bring suit on their right to treatment made
a subjective approach to each case impracticable, if not virtually impossible.
The court reacted in the only way possible to a situation created by legislative
abdication of responsibility.
TERESA

T.

MILTON

IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN HOUSING: LET THE BUYER REJOICE
Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (4th D.C.A. Fla.), aff'd, 264 So. 2d 418
(Fla. 1972)
Plaintiff condominium apartment owners attempted to recover in a suit
against the condominium builder-seller alleging that an air conditioner for
the entire complex was inherently faulty. The builder-seller had requested
555 dollars from each apartment owner to repair the system. Plaintiffs declined,
had the system repaired by an engineering company, and sued the defendant
to recover the cost of repairs. The trial court held for plaintiffs. On appeal,

the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed and HELD, that implied warranties of fitness and merchantibility extend to the purchase of new condominiums from builders.1
1. 258 So. 2d 11 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972). The district court certified the question to the
supreme court according to FL". Apr. R. 4.5 (c)(6); that court affirmed per curiam. Gable
v. Silver, 264 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1972).
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Although the defense of caveat emptor has been effectively eliminated in
the chattels market,' it has lingered on for a later, more dramatic death with
respect to real property.3 In viewing the built-in air conditioning system as
realty4 and by upholding the claim of implied warranty, the instant court
joins a growing number of courts5 and the majority of commentators6 in
rejecting caveat emptor as a real property defense.
In England, common law courts applied caveat emptor to real property
transactions,; and the doctrine originally applied in most American jurisdictions. The American courts that adhered to the doctrine have been loath to
9
make "legislative" changes by abandoning it.
However, mass produced
1°
housing and impersonal relationships between buyers and sellers" have
2
created a market totally unsuited to the doctrine.'
Courts have recognized the inequities of denying relief to a purchaser
who may have invested his life savings in a home 1 that subsequently proved

2. See, e.g., Entron, Inc. v. General Cablevision, 435 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1970); Sperry
Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964); Manheim v. Ford
Motor Co., 201 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1967); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358.
161 A.2d 69 (1960); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1961).
3. 258 So. 2d 11 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d
698 (1966); Brief for Appellee at 6, Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
4. "Air conditioners can either be fixtures, if they are removable, or realty, if they
are fixed ....
[T]he instant system was attached and immovable . . . . [We conclude
the instant air conditioning system was realty." 258 So. 2d at 14.
5. Comment, Implied Warranties in the Sale of New Homes, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 626
(1971).
6. 7 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §926A (3d ed. 1963); Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales
of Realty -Recent Assaults upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1961) [hereinafter cited
as Bearman].
7. 4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §926 (rev. ed. 1936); Note, Warranty of Quality: A
Comparative Survey, 14 TUL. L. REv. 327 (1940).
8. Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415, 131 So. 2d 884 (1961); Levy v. C. Young
Constr. Co., Inc., 46 N.J. Super. 293, 134 A.2d 717 (1957), (New Jersey has now accepted
implied warranty, see Schipper v. Leavitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965);
Steiber v. Palumbo, 219 Ore. 479, 347 P.2d 978 (1959).
9. Allen v. Wilkinson, 250 Md. 395, 243 A.2d 515 (1968); Brief for Appellant at 6,
Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972). But see Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark.
1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970), wherein it is stated: "[W]e have been presented with the timeworn, threadbare argument that a court is legislating whenever it modifies Common Law
rules to achieve justice in the light of modern economics and technological advances. That
same argument was doubtless made in a famous case that parallels this one: MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co .....
.Yet
the doctrine of the MacPherson case is now accepted as
commonplace throughout the nation. We have no doubt that the modification of the rule of
caveat emptor that we are now considering will be accepted with like unanimity within
a few years." Id. at 1099, 449 S.W.2d at 925.
10. See Bearman, supra note 6, at 542. By 1959 annual construction had reached 18
billion homes, while in 1945 it had only been 2 billion. The huge demand led to hurried
construction and skimping on materials.
11. Id.
12. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
13. Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91
Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966).
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uninhabitable or woefully inadequate as a dwelling.1 4 To avoid such harshness, courts have resorted to other legal theories: express warranty, marketable title, fraud, and negligence to circumvent caveat emptor.15
The first breach in the fortress occurred in England. A sale of a house
bought while under construction was considered to contain an implied
warranty as to proper workmanship.' 6 The opinion was based upon the theory
that the builder who sells a house while building it purports to be an expert
7
in construction and therefore impliedly warrants the fitness of his product.
Many American courts welcomed such an idea as a further inroad upon
caveat emptor.'8 For instance, in Weck v. A:M Sunrise Construction Co. a
purchaser-plaintiff was allowed to rely upon implied warranty when he
purchased under a contract for the sale of a residence only seventy-five per
cent complete. 9 The facts in the instant case could have supported a similar
holding 20 but the court wisely chose not to so restrict its decision, since the
"while under construction" dichotomy has proved meaningless. 21
Subsequent to Weck a court in Carpenterv. Donohoe allowed recovery on
implied warranty in a sale by a builder-vendor to the purchaser of a completed home.2 2 The Carpenter court and others placed primary importance
upon the reliance fostered by the seller and the reasonable expectations of the
purchaser.23 The question is no longer one of timing, but rather one of rela-

14. See, e.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969). Implied warranty
was found to apply to a leasehold when premises were infested with rats.
15. Bearman, supra note 6, at 554-56. Louisiana seems singular in having a legislative
answer to the problem-a redhibitive statute, the history of which dates back to 1641. The
pertinent article reads: "Redhibition is the avoidance of a sale on account of some vice
or defect in the thing sold, which renders it either absolutely useless, or its use so inconvenient and imperfect, that it must be supposed that the buyer would not have purchased
it, had he known of the vice." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2520 (West 1952). The statute applies to sales of realty as well as to sales of personalty. See Rodriguez v. Hudson, 79 So. 2d
578 (La. 1955), in which faulty plumbing was to be repaired by vendor in accordance with
such statute.
16. Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., [1931] 2 K.B. 113.
17. Id.
18. Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Weck v. A:M Sunrise
Constr. Co., 36 IIl. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962); Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio
App. 340, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1957); Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 32 Wash. 2d 830, 329

P.2d 474 (1958).
19. 36 Ill. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962).
20. Note, Florida Condominiums -Developer Abuses and Securities Law Implications
Create a Need for a State Regulatory Agency, 25 U. FLA L. Rav. 350 (1973). Most condomin-

ium apartment owners purchase their apartments from models before construction is completed.
21. Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 83, 388 P.2d 399, 402 (1964). "That a different
rule should apply to the purchaser of a house which is near completion than would apply
to one who purchases a new house seems incongruous. To say that the former may rely
on an implied warranty and the latter cannot is recognizing a distinction without a reasonable basis for it." Note, Implied Warranties in the Sale of New Houses, 26 U. Prrr. L. Ray.

862 (1965).
22. 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
23. E.g., Schipper v. Leavitt &Sons, Inc., 44 NJ. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
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tionships between buyer and seller.2 4 Discarding the time of sale distinction
has led to more complete acceptance of implied warranty.2 5
Caveat emptor has survived in the past upon the no longer viable theory
of equal footing between purchaser and seller.2 6 However, in Bethlahmy v.
Bechtel 27 such a theory was succinctly dismissed. The court said it was inequitable to presume equal footing between the average home purchaser and a
"builder who is daily engaged in the business of building and selling
houses."2s- Viewing trade relations realistically, the purchaser of a new residence is obviously not on such footing with a builder-vendor.2 9 To the contrary, the purchaser places great reliance on the builder-vendor30
Furthermore, in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc231 the court stated that the
builder-vendor is much more capable of absorbing costs. 3 2 The need for such
realism was endorsed by the instant court. 3 Even if the builder-vendor is

unaware of any errors, he is still in a better position to know than the purchaser.34 Consequently, even when inspection will not reveal a fault the
remedy of implied warranty should be available.2 5 A builder-vendor is now
considered liable under implied warranty in the majority of states that have
considered the problem.

36

Although Florida has not dealt extensively with implied warranties for
real property,37 there have been hints of judicial consideration. For example,
in Sorkin v. Rovin3s plaintiff brought an action for implied warranty con24. E.g., Doran v. Millan Dev. Co., 159 Cal. App. 2d 322, 323 P.2d 792 (1st Dist. 1958);
Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967).
25. Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963). But see Perry v. Sharon Dev. Co.,
411 All E.R. 390 [1937].
26. Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 1096. 449 S.W.2d 922. 924 (1970).
27. 415 P.2d 698, 710 (Idaho 1966).
28. Id.
29. See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
30. See Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
31. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
32. Id. at 91, 207 A.2d at 326.
33. 248 So. 2d at 15, quoting Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 551, 562 (Tex. 1968):
"The caveat emptor rule as applied to new houses is an anachronism patently out of
harmony with modern home buying practices."
34. House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969).
35. Id. at 435, 457 P.2d at 204.
36. Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154
Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1963); Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Supp. 476, 266 A.2d 200
(Litchfield County Super. Ct. 1970); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966);
Theis v. Heuer,
Ind. App.
, 270 N.E.2d 764 (1971); Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d
743 (Ct. App. Ky. 1969); Weeks v. Slavick Builders, Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d
503 (1970); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 176 S.E.2d 792 (1970); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1963); Short v. Mitchell, 454 S.W.2d 285
(Tex. Civ. App. 1970); Rothberg v. Olenik,
Vt.
, 262 A.2d 461 (1970). But see
Livingston v. Bedford, 284 Ala. 323, 224 So. 2d 873 (1969); Dooley v. Berkner, 113 Ga.
App. 162, 147 S.E.2d 685 (1966); Allen v. Wilkinson, 250 Md. 395, 243 A.2d 515 (Ct. App.
Md. 1968).
37. Comment, supra note 5, at 630.
38. 227 So. 2d 492 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
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cerning a defective seawall. The case was dismissed for procedural failures,
but the court indicated it would have accepted a properly pleaded cause of action under implied warranty. Florida has also expressed a policy of protection
for the novice home buyer. Allusion to such a policy was made by the court in
Ramel v. Chasebrook Construction Co.39 However, recovery was based on
deceit and the precedent is, therefore, important only for its result.The instant opinion presents an interesting question as to the extent of
liability imposed. It has been said that overly extensive liability to buildervendors would be avoided41 because the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
does not apply to used goods,42 and first purchasers alone would have a cause
of action. 43 The present court specifically exempted the instant situation from
the UCC provision- under the theory that the builder-vendor was not a
merchant nor was the air conditioner "goods," but realty.45 In carefully
worded dicta, which extends beyond most authority,46 the court speculated
upon the possibility that subsequent condominium apartment owners may
have standing to take action against the builder-vendor. 47 Such dicta is particularly timely. A multiple-family building may contain new owners and old
owners, and all should have equal standing to sue for a breach of implied
warranty that harms every apartment owner. Liability would not be crushing:
4
the test is reasonableness, not perfection.
The instant case is a dramatic decision placing Florida within the ranks
of those modem courts that eschew caveat emptor with respect to real property. Florida has placed on the implied warranty highway a particularly
modem vehicle: the condominium apartment, while appearing to endorse
the view that implied warranty would also apply to the builder-vendors of
49
new homes.

39.
40.
41.
(1965).

42.

135 So. 2d 876 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1961).
258 So. 2d at 17.
Note, Implied Warranties in the Sale of New Houses, 25 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 862, 866
UNIFORM CONIERCIAL CODE

§2-314. "A] warranty that the goods shall be merchan-

tible is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods
of that kind." FLA. STAT. §672.314 (1971).
43. Bearman, supra note 6, at 572.
44. 258 So. 2d at 17.
45. FLA. STAT. §692.2-104 (1969): "'Merchant' means a person who deals in goods of
the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved." FLA. STAT. §692.2-105 (1969): "'Goods' means
all things . . .which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale."
46. Bearman, supra note 6, at 631.
47. 258 So. 2d at 18. "We recognize that liability must have an end, but question the
creation of any artificial limits of either time or remoteness to the original purchaser."
48. Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 68, 154 N.W.2d 803, 809 (1967).
49. 258 So. 2d at 18. "The instant case deals with the first purchasers of condominium
homes.... We . . . realize ...
our facts limit our decision to the sale of new homes or
condominiums. . . . Thus, we flatly declare that the implied warranties of fitness and
merchantibility extend to the purchase of new condominiums in Florida from builders."
(Emphasis added.).
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